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Introduction 
 
Consistency, and avoiding undue disparity, is a central tenet of the sentencing 
system.1 Whilst consistency is a key sentencing goal, it must be balanced against 
other important goals, such as fairness and accountability.  
 
This paper explores the issue of consistency in the particular context of guilty pleas.  
If an offender is to be afforded a sentencing discount for pleading guilty, this raises 
issues of consistency and fairness, both in relation to the nature and quantity of 
discount given as between offenders, and in particular in relation to offenders who 
exercise their right to trial and cannot access the discount.   
 
In Australia, it has been held by the High Court that an offender who exercises their 
right to trial cannot be penalised for having done so.2 On the other hand, an offender 
who does plead guilty is entitled to receive a discount in sentence.3
Whilst there has been considerable judicial and academic debate in Australia over the 
nature and justification for the guilty plea discount,4 this paper examines the discount 
itself, and asks what effect it is having more generally in the context of consistency in 
sentencing.  
 
1 Geraldine Mackenzie, 'Achieving Consistency in Sentencing: Moving to Best Practice?' 
(2002) 22 University of Queensland Law Journal 74. 
2 Siganto v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 656.  
3 Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339. 
4 Ibid; see also, Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, 'Sentence Discount for a Guilty Plea: 
Time for a New Look' (1997) 1 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 123; Kathy Mack and Sharyn 
Roach Anleu, 'Reform of Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure: Guilty Pleas' (1998) 22 Criminal Law 
Journal 263; David Field, 'Plead Guilty Early and Convincingly to Avoid Disappointment' 
(2002) 14 Bond Law Review 251;Mirko Bagaric and Julie Brebner, 'The Solution to the 
Dilemma Presented by the Guilty Plea Discount: The Qualified Guilty Plea - I'm Pleading 
Guilty Only Because of the Discount...' (2002) 30 International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law 51. 
2Guilty plea discount  
 
In most common law jurisdictions it has now been accepted that an accused person is 
entitled to a discount in sentence for a guilty plea.5 How much discount is given in a 
particular case varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and case to case, but there is 
rarely a prescribed amount.  Generally the discount is left to the discretion of the 
individual sentencer, taking into account all of the circumstances of the case.  Factors 
which are relevant can include the time at which the guilty plea indication is given 
and remorse.  
 
Because the discount given varies from case to case and depends on the discretion of 
the individual sentencer, this has an inevitable effect on consistency, albeit justifiable 
in many cases.  Unless a set discount is given in particular nominated circumstances, 
the actual sentence to be obtained cannot be accurately predicted, or indeed compared 
with that given in another case.  
 
Justification for the discount 
 
There has been a paradigm shift in recent years from earlier Australian cases where a 
plea of guilty could only be taken into account in mitigation of sentence where it 
resulted from genuine remorse, or where it resulted from a willingness to cooperate in 
the administration of justice, by saving the expense and inconvenience of a trial or the 
necessity of witnesses to give evidence.6 These earlier cases did not agree that a plea 
of guilty on its own could mitigate: 
 
5 In Australia see R v Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339; and summary of the principles in 
Australian Law Reform Commission, 'Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal 
Offenders' (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2006), Chapter 11 “Discounts and 
Remissions”. See generally Ralph Henham, 'Bargain Justice or Justice Denied? Sentencing 
Discounts and the Criminal Process' (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 515; Ralph Henham, 
''Truth in Plea-Bargaining': Anglo-American Approaches to the Use of Guilty Plea Discounts 
at the Sentencing Stage' (2000) 29 Anglo-American Law Review 1.   
6 The Queen v Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442, at 452-453 per King CJ; see also R v Gray [1976] 
VR 225; and R v Harman [1989] 1 Qd R 414.   
3On the other hand, a simple confession of guilt cannot, by its own force, 
operate so as to command that the sentence be less than that which it would 
have been had there been no such confession.7
Perhaps the change to a more pragmatic approach in Australia can be traced to the 
move in the early 1990’s to dedicated sentencing legislation setting out principles to 
be applied.  For example, the Victorian Sentencing Act 1991 looks at “whether the 
offender pleaded guilty to the offence and, if so, the stage in the proceedings at which 
the offender did so or indicated an intention to do so”.8 The Queensland Penalties 
and Sentences Act 1992 similarly refers only to the time at which the offender pleaded 
guilty or indicated the intention to so plead.9 In Queensland remorse is mentioned 
separately, and is only relevant in offences involving violence against another person, 
or sexual offences against children under the age of 16.10 In these instances it is the 
lack of remorse which is more relevant that the remorse itself.  
 
The present Australian position on guilty pleas is expressed in the High Court case of 
Cameron v The Queen.11 According to Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ, 
 
Reconciliation of the requirement that a person not be penalised for pleading 
not guilty with the rule that a plea of guilty may be taken into account in 
mitigation requires that the rationale for that rule, so far as it depends on 
factors other than remorse and acceptance of responsibility, be expressed in 
terms of willingness to facilitate the course of justice, and not on the basis that 
the plea has saved the community of the expense of a contested hearing. 12 
Most, if not all, Australian courts now accept that an accused person is entitled to a 
discount when pleading guilty, even when that plea occurs at the last moment.13 In 
Queensland, the current practice is that a guilty plea will attract a discount of around 
30% of the sentence, particularly when the plea is entered or indicated at an early 
 
7 The Queen v Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442, 446 per King CJ.  
8 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5. 
9 Penalties and Sentences Act 1991 (Qld), s 13. 
10 See ss 9(4)(i), and 9(6)h).   
11 (2002) 209 CLR 339.   
12 Ibid at 343.  The possible penalising of an offender who pleads not guilty is discussed below. 
13 See eg, Atholwood (1999) 109 A Crim R 465 (WA); R v Corrigan [1994] 2 Qd R 415.   
4stage of the proceedings.  The discount may not always take the form of a reduction in 
the head sentence, but may for example be a community based sentence instead of 
custodial, or a recommendation for early release.  The closer to the trial date, the less 
benefit there is likely to be, but there is no formal sliding scale, and the practice is that 
a substantial discount will still be available, even if the plea is entered at a late stage.  
 
Remorse 
 
In Cameron, the joint judgment did not elaborate on the factors of remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility, and how these should be taken into account.  I would 
respectfully agree with the approach by Kirby J on these issues, where his Honour 
elaborates on the way in which a guilty plea should be taken into account, and 
distinguishes between the discount for a guilty plea, with that resulting from a 
“spontaneous and immediate expression of remorse conducive to reform”.14 To those 
of us who have practised in criminal law, his Honour’s ironic statement that “[C]ases 
do exist where, upon apprehension, a prisoner expresses genuine and believable 
regret” rings true.  But as his Honour goes on to say: 
 
However, judges have lately expressed doubt as to the extent to which pleas of 
guilty really proceed from such motives.  In a prisoner who has been caught 
red-handed, the plea of guilty may indicate regret at being caught and charged, 
rather than regret for involvement in the crime. [references omitted]15 
I also respectfully agree with his Honour that the main features of the public interest 
in a discount of a guilty plea are “purely utilitarian”.16 These include the saved cost 
and inconvenience of a potentially lengthy trial, easing the congestion in the courts, 
vindicating public confidence in the in the criminal justice system, and assisting the 
 
14 Cameron at [65], subpara (4).   
15 Ibid at 360.   
16 Ibid.  Theoretically there is little valid justification.  See discussion in Mirko Bagaric and Julie 
Brebner, 'The Solution to the Dilemma Presented by the Guilty Plea Discount: The Qualified 
Guilty Plea - I'm Pleading Guilty Only Because of the Discount...' (2002) 30 International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law 51; and Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, 'Sentence 
Discount for a Guilty Plea: Time for a New Look' (1997) 1 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 
123. 
5victims of crime to put the experience behind them.17 I would also agree that if 
remorse is to be taken into account at all,18 it should be a separate consideration from 
the discount for a plea of guilty.   
 
His Honour then points out that an accused person is entitled to plead not guilty to the 
charges against them, and to put the prosecution to proof; and further the fact that they 
cannot be punished more severely for having exercised those rights.19 This is where 
the major point of inconsistency lies.   
 
No penalty for exercising right to trial 
 
As the majority judgment of Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ in Cameron pointed 
out, an accused person cannot be penalised for having exercised their right to trial, 
applying the principle from the earlier case of Siganto v The Queen.20 According to 
their Honours: 
 
Although a plea of guilty may be taken into account in mitigation, a convicted 
person may not be penalised for having insisted on his or her right to trial.  
The distinction between allowing a reduction for a plea of guilty and not 
penalising a convicted person for not pleading guilty is not without its 
subtleties, but it is, nonetheless, a real distinction, albeit one the rationale for 
which may need some refinement in expression if the distinction is to be seen 
as non discriminatory.21 [My emphasis] 
 
Their Honours then go on to note that the reconciliation between the requirement not 
to penalise the accused person for pleading not guilty, and to be able to take into 
 
17 Ibid (Cameron) at 361.  
18 There are those who argue that it has no place in mitigation of sentence: Mirko Bagaric and 
Kumar Amarasekara, 'Feeling Sorry? - Tell Someone Who Cares: The Irrelevance of Remorse 
in Sentencing' (2001) 40 The Howard Journal 364. 
19 Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 at 361. 
20 (1998) 194 CLR 656. 
21 Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 at 343. 
6account the plea, lies with the rationale of the accused’s willingness to facilitate the 
course of justice.22 
No doubt what the High Court is guarding against is the situation where an accused 
person receives an additional penalty for having gone to trial.  In other words, having 
the election to go to trial act as an aggravating factor on the eventual sentence, as 
opposed to simply missing out on the discount which a guilty plea will almost 
inevitably provide.  As their Honours said, this distinction is “not without its 
subtleties”.23 
Once an accused person exercises their right to trial, the opportunity to claim a 
discount for a guilty plea is lost.  This discount can be sizable, up to 30% in some 
instances.  In Queensland, and no doubt most Australian jurisdictions, the discount is 
available even where the guilty plea is entered the last minute, with little or any co-
operation with law enforcement agencies, let alone remorse.24 On the other hand, an 
accused person may have co-operated extensively in the investigation, be genuinely 
remorseful, willing to facilitate the course of justice, yet may wish to exercise their 
right to trial.  There are a number of reasons why this would be so.   
 
The classic reason why an accused may elect to put the Crown to proof is where they 
have no memory of the event in question due to intoxication by drugs or alcohol, or 
perhaps another reason, for example temporary amnesia following a car accident the 
subject of the charge. Although there is a view that a guilty plea can be entered in 
these circumstances provided that the accused person understands and agrees that the 
plea indicates an acceptance of the Crown case,25 many accused would take the option 
of putting the Crown to proof in these circumstances, particularly if they have no 
recollection and cannot understand how the offence came about.  
 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  See also discussion in David Field, 'Plead Guilty Early and Convincingly to Avoid 
Disappointment' (2002) 14 Bond Law Review 251; Mirko Bagaric and Julie Brebner, 'The 
Solution to the Dilemma Presented by the Guilty Plea Discount: The Qualified Guilty Plea - 
I'm Pleading Guilty Only Because of the Discount...' (2002) 30 International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law 51. 
24 See eg the case of R v Corrigan [1994] 2 Qd R 415, an early case under the Penalties and 
Sentences Act 1991 (Qld).  
25 Peter Hidden, 'Some Ethical Problems for the Criminal Advocate' (2003) 27 Criminal Law 
Journal 191.  
7Another reason why a person may elect to go to trial notwithstanding remorse, co-
operation or willingness to facilitate the course of justice, is where there is the 
availability of a defence to the charges.  For example, there may be a valid argument 
that the person was acting in self defence, which would result in a full acquittal should 
the elements of the defence be accepted.  This however may put the accused in the 
invidious position of having to decide whether to forgo the possibility of acquittal and 
plead guilty to the offence, knowing that a discount of up to 30% of the sentence 
would be available for the guilty plea; or plead not guilty on the basis of self defence, 
knowing that a conviction was still a distinct possibility, and further in the full 
knowledge that no discounting in the sentence could occur on the basis of the not 
guilty plea.  
 
On the other hand, there may be reasons why a person may want to plead guilty whilst 
maintaining their innocence.  These can include a wish to get the matter over and 
done with quickly; a desire not to admit guilt to the legal representatives or the court 
even though the person may in fact be guilty; or a desire not to reveal other conduct, 
legal or illegal, which a trial may disclose.26 To these can be added a desire to plead 
guilty to attract a discount of up to 30% on sentence, not insignificant where the 
chances of success on a trial may be slim.27 The other benefit of pleading guilty, 
which may particularly arise in marginal cases, is the opportunity to negotiate a set of 
agreed facts which form the basis of the plea, rather than relying on the evidence 
which may come out at trial.  
 
Victims 
 
Underlying some of the assumptions of the desirability of a guilty plea, and therefore 
discount, is the premise that it benefits victims by more rapidly dealing with the 
matter, and sparing the victim the ordeal of giving evidence.  This may well be the 
 
26 Ibid at 196.   
27 See Mirko Bagaric and Julie Brebner, 'The Solution to the Dilemma Presented by the Guilty 
Plea Discount: The Qualified Guilty Plea - I'm Pleading Guilty Only Because of the 
Discount...' (2002) 30 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 51; David Field, 'Plead 
Guilty Early and Convincingly to Avoid Disappointment' (2002) 14 Bond Law Review 251; 
Ralph Henham, 'Bargain Justice or Justice Denied? Sentencing Discounts and the Criminal 
Process' (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 515. 
8case; however without the benefit of detailed research it is difficult to know whether 
these assumptions are correct.  As Henham points out, not all victims may be of this 
view: 
 
Further, some victims may prefer the ordeal of a court appearance to seeing 
the defendant receive a light sentence as a result of a sentencing discount, 
whether graduated or not.  Past support for plea discounts and crime control 
ideology, with its emphasis on financial constraint, speed and finality of 
conviction, has been on the basis that it is broadly in the interests of victims 
because it spares the victims the ordeal of giving evidence while recognising 
that due process rights such as the right to a fair and public hearing may be 
infringed and some innocent defendants may be induced to plead guilty.28 
A study by Fenwick suggests that these matters are more complex than generally 
thought, and that there should be more consultation with victims in relation to these 
matters.29 
Transparency in the sentencing process 
 
A study by Henham of sentencing discounts in the Crown Court in the UK has 
suggested the need for reform in the way in which guilty pleas are taken into 
account.30 The findings of that study suggested a need for greater transparency in the 
way in which sentencing discounts are taken into account, and that greater guidance 
should be provided to sentencers.31 With little prescription of exactly how the 
discount should be taken into account in Australia being provided,32 the findings of 
the study would apply equally here. 
 
28 Ralph Henham, 'Bargain Justice or Justice Denied? Sentencing Discounts and the Criminal 
Process' (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 515, at 537. 
29 H Fenwick, 'Procedural Rights of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the 
Criminal Justice Process' (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 317. 
30 Ralph Henham, 'Bargain Justice or Justice Denied? Sentencing Discounts and the Criminal 
Process' (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 515. 
31 Ibid at 535.   
32 Cf R v Thomson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383. 
9Henham notes that well known sentencing scholar Andrew Ashworth argues 
convincingly that fundamental reform of the UK system of sentencing discounts is 
necessary on the basis of contravention of fundamental rights in the European 
Convention of Human Rights, namely the presumption of innocence, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the right to equality of treatment and the right to a fair and 
public hearing.33 Henham also notes Ashworth’s support of the reappraisal of the 
guilty plea discount, which suggests either abolition or that major changes should 
occur.34 
An Australian study by Mack and Anleu involving over 50 interviews with judges, 
police prosecutors, DPP staff and defence lawyers concluded that the sentencing 
discount for guilty pleas was wrong in principle and should no longer be supported.35 
According to Mack and Anleu, the sentencing discount is a plea bargain in its crudest 
form.36 They go on to say, 
 
It puts an inappropriate burden on the accused’s choice to plead guilty, 
undermines proper sentencing principles, risks inducing a guilty plea from the 
innocent, undermines judicial neutrality and independence, and does not 
directly address the problems of time and delay which motivated its 
introduction by the courts.37 
One suggestion to improve efficiency and transparency is the use of sentence 
indications by judges at the pre-trial stage.38 This call has been recently taken up by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission, who has recommended the use of sentence 
indication hearings in relation to the sentencing of Commonwealth offenders.39 In a 
press release dated 22 June, the ALRC called for overhaul of the Federal sentencing 
 
33 Ralph Henham, 'Bargain Justice or Justice Denied? Sentencing Discounts and the Criminal 
Process' (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 515 at 537. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, 'Sentence Discount for a Guilty Plea: Time for a New 
Look' (1997) 1 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 123. 
36 Ibid at 124. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See discussion in Arie Freiberg and John Willis, 'Sentence Indication' (2003) 27 Criminal Law 
Journal 246. 
39 Australian Law Reform Commission, 'Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal 
Offenders' (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2006), Chapter 15 “A Sentence Indication 
Scheme”. 
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system to provide greater consistency, fairness and clarity.  The review of the way in 
which sentencing discounts are provided is an important part of this. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whilst it is uncontroversial that consistency is a major goal of sentencing, the way in 
which guilty pleas are dealt with, and in particular the routine use of the plea of guilty 
discount, may not be the best way to achieve this. Whilst there has been widespread 
acceptance of the need for such discounts,40 there is a need for greater consideration 
of the theoretical and policy basis on which they are awarded, the way in which they 
are used in practice, and their effect on consistency and fairness in the sentencing 
system more generally.  
 
40 See discussion in Australian Law Reform Commission, 'Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing 
of Federal Offenders' (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2006), Chapter 11. 
